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Abstract 9 
Transparent, performance-based approaches to allocating fishing opportunities are required for 10 
signatories to the Aarhus Convention and ƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶhŶŝŽŶ ?Ɛ  ?EU) Member States via the Common 11 
Fisheries Policy. The lack of an operational framework to support this requirement means such a system 12 
is seldom explicitly used. Using the English commercial sea bass (Dicentrarchus labrax) fishery as a case 13 
study, operationalisation of this policy requirement is evaluated using a Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis 14 
(MCDA) framework. MCDA is a decision-making tool allowing users to explicitly evaluate complex, 15 
potentially conflicting, criteria, enabling wider costs and benefits to be considered. The sea bass fishery 16 
was selected as the dramatic stock decline since 2010 has meant difficult policy choices regarding the 17 
allocation of scarce fishing opportunities between different user groups. To inform the MCDA, the three 18 
main English sea bass fishing methods (nets, hooks, and trawls) are evaluated across thirteen social, 19 
economic, and environmental criteria to generate a performance score. Importance weightings for each 20 
criterion, developed from 50 surveys of fishers, industry representatives, managers, non-governmental 21 
organisations, and the wider public, are used to combine these performance scores generating an overall 22 
score for the MCDA. Results show that regardless of stakeholder group questioned, hooks achieve the 23 
highest MCDA performance, followed by nets, and then trawls. This suggests that taking a performance-24 
based approach to the allocation of fishing opportunities in the English fishing fleet have a prioritisation 25 
by fishing type. MCDA could be used to promote transparency, objectivity and social, environmental and 26 
economic sustainability into European and UK fisheries. 27 
Keywords: Fisheries allocation; Fisheries Management; Sea bass; Common Fisheries Policy; Multi-28 
Criteria Decision Analysis; Decision Support.   29 
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1 Introduction 30 
Fisheries resources are finite in supply but desired by many users (they are rivalrous). Limited fishing 31 
opportunities must therefore be allocated to users with competing demands based on a framework to 32 
avoid overexploitation which may result from the divergence between individual and collective interests 33 
[1]. In accordance with international obligations [2] to avoid over exploitation of resources, the 34 
sustainable management of fish stocks is required. In Europe, the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP, 35 
REGULATION (EU) No 1380/2013) [3] and Marine Strategy Framework Directive (MSFD) [4] provide the 36 
legislative framework setting out the goal of achieving Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) and Good 37 
Environmental Status (GES) by 2020 for all commercially exploited fish stocks [5]. Accordingly, allocations 38 
of fishing opportunities by the European Commission are, in principle if not in practice, made to EU 39 
Member States in line with these objectives for the major shared fisheries [6]. 40 
The national distribution of fishing opportunities should follow Article 17 of the CFP which specifies that 41 
Member States use  “transparent and objective criteria including those of an environmental, social and 42 
economic nature [7]. ?Article 17 requires fleets that deliver best value to society to be given preferential 43 
access to fishing opportunities. However, the practical application of this broad policy objective is not 44 
specified and the current allocation of fishing opportunities often relies on piecemeal historic decisions. 45 
This presents the potential for conflict with the provisions of the United Nations Aarhus Convention 46 
which provides the public with rights regarding access to information, public participation and access to 47 
justice, in governmental decision-making processes on matters concerning the local, national and 48 
transboundary environment with a focus on interactions between the public and public authorities.  49 
When considering fisheries management objectives and developing allocation criteria, a number of 50 
studies have examined options for allocation (including criteria and indicators), beyond the widespread 51 
 ?ŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐƐŚĂƌĞ ?ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ [8,9,10,11]. However, a significant gap remains in the peer-reviewed academic 52 
literature with no practical guidance on how to turn potential criteria into the allocation of fishing 53 
opportunities. 54 
Using the English sea bass (Dicentrarchus labrax) fishery as a case study, multiple-criteria decision 55 
analysis (MCDA) is explored as a tool for transparently allocating fishing opportunities in a non-total 56 
allowable catch (TAC) operated fishery. Sea bass was exemplified because it is an important commercial 57 
and recreational stock [12] that has undergone a severe decline in recent years, following a period of 58 
poor recruitment due to adverse environmental conditions (Figure 1) coupled with unchecked 59 
expansion of fishing effort and unsustainable catch levels [13]. In brief, the commercial sea bass fishery 60 
is split between an offshore fishery on spawning aggregations, mainly using pelagic trawls and drift nets, 61 
and an inshore fishery using a variety of gears (fixed nets, rods, and lines) targeting sea bass after 62 
spawning and/or juvenile fish [14]. The fishery is mainly exploited by fleets from France, the UK, and the 63 
Netherlands with equal landings from the UK and France in 2016, despite France previously catching two 64 
thirds of the EU total (see Figure S1) [15]. Since 2015, following steep declines in spawning stock (Figure 65 
1) the European Union (EU) has introduced Emergency Measures, closing the fishery, limiting 66 
recreational angling and commercial catches, and increasing the minimum legal landing size [16]. This 67 
study does not consider the question of allocation between commercial and recreational take, but the 68 
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methodology could also be applied between these sectors. A full history of the sea bass fishery is 69 
provided in the Supplementary Material. 70 
Continued debate regarding further fishing opportunities amongst Member States, the commercial and 71 
recreational sectors, and different fishing gear operators within the commercial sector is expected. With 72 
so few fishing opportunities available for sea bass, great care must be made that opportunities maximise 73 
social and economic value while minimising environmental damage and several reports on EU fisheries 74 
have advocated a criteria-based approach to quota allocation [17,18]. Based on this a set of social, 75 
economic and environmental objectives for use in the UK sea bass fishery were developed. While the UK 76 
will be leaving the CFP following Brexit (the departure of the UK from the European Union as a result of 77 
a referendum held in June 2016) [19] ?ƚŚĞĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚŽĨƌƚŝĐůĞ ? ?ŝƐĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶƚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞh<'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ78 
Marine Policy Statement of promoting good governance and achieving a sustainable economy [20]. The 79 
findings of this study can therefore be used to inform fisheries allocation across the EU and in the UK 80 
post-Brexit  81 
2 The English sea bass fishery 82 
2.1 Stock decline 83 
Sea bass is an important commercial and recreational stock [21]. Owing to its popularity on menus and 84 
availability to fishers as a non-quota species, increased catches between 2000 and 2010 proved 85 
unsustainable and the Northern European stock has undergone a severe decline in recent years (Figure 86 
1) [22] and the Southern stock appears to be following the same trajectory [23].  87 
 88 
Fig. 1. Spawning stock biomass of the Northern European stock of sea bass (Reconstructed from ICES data [22]). 89 
Abbreviations: SSB ʹ spawning stock biomass, Bpa ʹ precautionary reference point for SSB, MSYBtrigger ʹ the 90 
lower 95% confidence limits (of SSB) with exploitation at FMSY from long-term simulations, Blim ʹ limit 91 
reference point for SSB. 92 
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Sea bass grow slowly, do not mature until 4 ?7 years of age, and have been recorded up to 28 years of 93 
age [24]. Juvenile sea bass up to three years of age occupy nursery areas in estuaries whilst adults 94 
undertake seasonal migrations from inshore habitats to offshore spawning sites where they are targeted 95 
by pelagic trawlers [25]. After spawning, sea bass tend to return to the same coastal sites each year [26]. 96 
The combination of slow growth, late maturity, spawning aggregation, and strong site fidelity, increase 97 
the vulnerability of sea bass to over-exploitation and localized depletion [27]. 98 
2.2 The fishery 99 
France has long been responsible for the majority of sea bass landings since the fishery started at a scale 100 
to be recorded. The winter pelagic trawl fishery was conducted only by French vessels with UK vessels 101 
excluded by UK-specific regulations due to concerns over cetacean bycatch [28]. Starting in January 2015 102 
the EU introduced Emergency Measures for sea bass (described in Section 2.4), closing the spawning 103 
fishery, limiting recreational angling and commercial catches by gear type and area, as well as increasing 104 
the minimum legal landing size. In the past few years, the UK share of the fishery has increased as a 105 
result of Emergency Measures closed the French offshore fishery.  106 
UK vessels landed 501 tonnes of sea bass in 2016 with a first sale value of £5 million. Of that volume, 107 
487 tonnes were from English vessels and 61 tonnes were from Welsh vessels [29]. Over 42% of English 108 
landings were from six ports, which are listed in Table 1.  109 
Table 1. Major ports for the English sea bass fishery (MMO [30]).  110 
Port Weight (kg) Value (£) 
Weymouth 49,920 562,470 
Brixham 41,163 397,003 
Plymouth 31,535 359,197 
Eastbourne 33,421 325,731 
Portsmouth 26,676 245,115 
Newhaven 24,127 208,309 
England total 487,109 4,502,050 
 111 
The English sea bass fishery can generally be categorized into three gear types: nets, hooks, and trawls. 112 
In 2016, vessels using nets landed 223 tonnes of sea bass (465), vessels using hooks landed 181 tonnes 113 
(37%) and vessels using trawls landed 81 tonnes (17%) (Figure 2) [30]. 114 
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 115 
Fig. 2. Composition of English sea bass landings by gear type. (Reconstructed from MMO data [30]). 116 
2.3 Current management challenges 117 
The recent decline in sea bass has been linked to multiple factors:  overfishing of the spawning stock 118 
during winter spawning aggregations, a minimum size that could not guarantee enough sea bass were 119 
reaching spawning size before capture (i.e. recruitment overfishing), and environmental conditions 120 
which had impacted the survival of recent sea bass cohorts leading to poor recruitment. Scientific advice 121 
from the International Council of the Sea (ICES) had not been followed by European fisheries ministers 122 
ever since a precautionary cut in landings by 20% was advised in 2012 [31,32]. The resulting negative 123 
trend of the stock meant urgent action needed to be taken in December 2014 for the 2015 fishing year 124 
[33]. ICES continued to advise more stringent reductions in landings, culminating in the advice for zero 125 
landings (commercial and recreational) for 2017 and 2018 (when applying a precautionary approach 126 
[34,35]).  127 
Sea bass does not have a total allowable catch (TAC). Resistance to catch limits largely emerge from a 128 
disagreement between Member States on the appropriate reference period to use to calculate relative 129 
shares [36]. This absence of total catch limits has led to increased pressure on the stock in the last 130 
decade, especially from fishers without quota holdings for TAC species. Small-scale fishers in particular 131 
have difficulties acquiring quota holdings and can either exit the fishery or focus their fishing effort on 132 
non-TAC species (such as sea bass). Many have opted for the latter and the cumulative impact has led to 133 
a rapid and alarming decline of stock biomass.  134 
2.4 Recent management measures 135 
To halt this decline in the sea bass stock and try to mitigate the risks of a collapsed fishery, in 2015 the 136 
UK Government requested that the EU instigate a set of Emergency Measures under Article 12 of the 137 
CFP [37]. These initial Emergency Measures [38], implemented between January 2015 and December 138 
2016 include a ban on pelagic trawling during spawning season; an increase in Minimum Conservation 139 
Reference Size from 36 to 42cm and maximum monthly catches by gear type as well as restrictions of 3 140 
  
6 
 
fish per day per recreational angler [39] (which was reduced to 1 in 2017), closed areas [40] and a closed 141 
season during February and March [41]. 142 
The ICES advice for both 2017 and 2018 fishing opportunities was for zero catch (both commercial and 143 
recreational) [42, 43]. This has meant the debate regarding continuation of fishing opportunities 144 
amongst Member States, the commercial and recreational sectors, and different fishing gear operators 145 
within the commercial sector is ongoing. The 2017 December Council proposed further restrictions for 146 
2018, reducing the bycatch allowance for trawls and nets, reducing the hook and line catches to 5 147 
tonnes and closing the recreational fishery44. 148 
3 The use of criteria in allocating fishing opportunities  149 
3.1 Guidance from the Common Fisheries Policy 150 
While the setting of many fishing limits in the EU is made through negotiations of the Council of 151 
Ministers, the allocation of these fishing opportunities is largely the responsibility of each Member 152 
State. Article 17 of the CFP does provide some guidance on how these allocations should be considered: 153 
 “When allocating the fishing opportunities available to them, as referred to in Article 16, 154 
Member States shall use transparent and objective criteria including those of an 155 
environmental, social and economic nature. The criteria to be used may include, inter alia, 156 
the impact of fishing on the environment, the history of compliance, the contribution to 157 
the local economy and historic catch levels. Within the fishing opportunities allocated to 158 
them, Member States shall endeavour to provide incentives to fishing vessels deploying 159 
selective fishing gear or using fishing techniques with reduced environmental impact, such 160 
as reduced energy consumption or habitat damage ? [45]. 161 
Article 17 therefore requires fleets that deliver best value to society to be given preferential access to 162 
fishing opportunities and develops a set of transparent and objective criteria. These criteria include a 163 
mixture of economic, environmental and social indicators, which focus on selectivity, resource 164 
dependency and wider environmental impact. 165 
The dire situation of the sea bass stocks creates a unique context to put a detailed criteria-based 166 
allocation framework (maximising social and economic value while minimising environmental damage) 167 
into action. MCDA as a decision-making tool has previously been used to look at fisheries sustainability 168 
indicators [46], trade-off analysis in fisheries management decisions [47], and fishing gear impacts [48], 169 
however few have applied it to allocation of opportunities [49]. 170 
Several reports on EU fisheries have advocated a criteria-based approach to quota allocation [50,51]. A 171 
2013 report for the EU Parliament suggested a suite of criteria that would interest stakeholders and also 172 
have readily available data [52].   173 
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3.2 Setting objectives  174 
Setting fisheries management objectives is key to the transparent monitoring of the performance of 175 
fisheries. However, objective setting is frequently neglected or inadequate [53]. If stakeholders are not 176 
involved, or do not understand the objectives, generating support for management plans will be 177 
difficult. According to the Food and Agriculture Organisation, the goals in fisheries management can be 178 
split into subsets: biological; ecological; economic and social, which includes political and cultural goals 179 
[54]. Incorporating economic, biological, social and environmental objectives into a single framework 180 
and including stakeholder views is essential for management success [55].  181 
The UK Government has its own vision, outlined in Fisheries 2027 - Vision Statement, that also 182 
emphasises the economic, social and environmental dimensions of fisheries: 183 
 “'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƌŽůĞis to manage this asset on behalf of society and to get the most 184 
ďĞŶĞĨŝƚƐĨŽƌƚŽĚĂǇ ?ƐĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐĂŶĚĨƵƚƵƌĞŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?dŚĞĨ ǁŝŶƐŽĐŝĞƚǇǁŚŽĐĂƚĐŚ185 
fish are responsible for doing so efficiently. This means getting the best possible 186 
economic and social benefits from fishing for the least environmental cost  ? 187 
including safeguarding stocks for the future. It is the role of processors and retailers 188 
ŝŶƚŚĞƐƵƉƉůǇĐŚĂŝŶƚŽĂĐƚƐƵƐƚĂŝŶĂďůǇ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞĐŽŶƐƵŵĞƌ ?ƐƌŽůĞŝƐƚŽĐŚŽŽƐĞ189 
sustainably ? [56]. 190 
 191 
There is a particular emphasis on moving beyond fleet economics and capturing benefits to coastal 192 
communities, wider society, and future generations. The statement commits to managing fisheries for 193 
ƚŚĞ “long-term benefits for the whole of society ? and determining access to ĐĞƌƚĂŝŶĨŝƐŚŝŶŐƚǇƉĞƐ “even if 194 
in some cases that is not the most economically efficient way of harvesting the resource ?ĂƐ “wider 195 
economic, social and environmental benefits of small-scale fishing can outweigh the comparative 196 
inefficiency in harvesting the resource. ? [57] 197 
Based on Article 17 of the CFP and this clear statement of vision from the UK government, a set of social, 198 
economic and environmental objectives for use in the English sea bass fishery were developed.  199 
4 Methods  200 
4.1 Multi-criteria decision analysis  201 
Multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA) is a decision-making tool that allows users to explicitly evaluate 202 
complex, and potentially conflicting, criteria, allowing wider costs and benefits to be taken into account. 203 
MCDA has been used in many fields including health [58], energy [59], development [60] and finance 204 
[61] and enables managers to establish and communicate defined social, economic, and environmental 205 
goals. Given the potential value of MCDA, and its previous application in fisheries and other marine 206 
management contexts [62, 63, 64, 65, 66], it was selected as a potentially suitable tool to enact the 207 
Article 17 requirements of the reformed CFP. Furthermore, since the decision of the UK to exit the EU, 208 
this examination of the technique has value when considering how the UK might allocate resources 209 
when no longer a member of EU. 210 
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Using the English sea bass fishery to test the potential of MCDA for the allocation of fishing 211 
opportunities, information on gear performance was combined with criteria weights derived from a 212 
survey of stakeholders to display the trade-offs between different gears and criteria. A MCDA utility 213 
score is generated for each gear through weighted summation and then converted to a score out of 100 214 
by dividing by the maximum possible result. 215 ܯܥܦܣ௚ ൌ   ? ௉೎ǡ೒ௐ೎ ? ௉೘ௐ೎   (Equation 1) 216 
Where P is the performance score for each criterion, W is the weighting applied, g is a gear category, c is 217 
the criteria, and m is the maximum performance score of 5. This weighted approach to performance 218 
aggregation is a commonly used approach in MCDA. Critically, it assumes that criteria are independent 219 
and that they can be traded off against each other [67]. 220 
4.2 Criteria by which to determine best value to society, according to Article 17 of the CFP 221 
Building on the objectives outlined in the UK GŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐFisheries 2027 vision document, thirteen 222 
criteria and indicators were chosen to operationalise the requirement for environmental, social, and 223 
economic criteria under Article 17 of the CFP (Table 2).  224 
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Table 2. Criteria for the allocation of sea bass fishing opportunities under Article 17 of the CFP. 225 
Criteria Description Indicator 
Profits Profits are important to generate economic activity while 
minimising costs and ensure a financially sustainable industry. 
£/kg landed weight 
Employment Fishing creates jobs by providing a viable economic opportunity. 
Often these jobs are created in marginal coastal communities 
with high unemployment. 
jobs/kg landed weight 
Greenhouse gas 
emissions 
Fuel use from fishing generates greenhouse gas emissions which 
contribute to climate change. 
kgs of CO2/kg landed 
weight 
Subsidies The fishing industry receives subsidies in different forms. This 
masks true performance and deprives governments of funds for 
other purposes. 
£/kg landed weight 
Economic value chain The impact of fishing does not stop when a fish is caught. 
Economic impacts continue through processing, transport and 
other secondary industries generating economic activity and 
employment. 
price/kg landed weight 
Sea bass discards Sea bass discards result from undersized fish being caught. 
Depending on survivability when discarded this can increase 
fishing mortality. 
kgs of sea bass/kg of sea 
bass landed 
Other discards Discards from other species result from undersized or non-
commercial fish being caught. Depending on survivability when 
discarded this can increase fishing mortality. 
kgs of discards/kg landed 
weight 
Spawning season 
mortality 
Fishing during particular seasons and in particular areas can 
damage a fish stock when it is reproducing. This leads to lower 
fish populations than would result from the fishing activity itself. 
amount of fishing taking 
place during spawning 
season 
Bycatch Bycatch is the unintended capture of marine wildlife such as 
dolphins, birds, turtles or seals. This can damage or kill the 
captured wildlife. 
Risk Assessment for 
Sourcing Seafood (RASS) 
score (1 low risk - 5 high 
risk) 
Ecosystem damage Fishing activity can harm the marine environment and destroy 
habitats. This can lead to lower populations and a loss of 
biodiversity. 
Risk Assessment for 
Sourcing Seafood (RASS) 
score (1 low risk - 5 high 
risk) 
Ghost fishing Ghost fishing occurs when fishing gear is lost in the water. This 
entangles fish and causes fishing mortality. 
Descriptive from 
literature 
Fleet dependency Some fishing fleets heavily rely on certain types of fishing for their 
economic activity. Any policy change should ensure limited 
impacts where dependency is high. 
Percentage of total value 
from sea bass landings 
(%) 
Port dependency Some ports heavily rely on certain types of fishing for their 
economic activity. Any policy change should ensure limited 
impacts where dependency is high. 
Percentage of sea bass 
landings to sea bass-
dependent ports 
(>£10,000 and >10% of 
landed value) 
 226 
4.3 Data sources and availability 227 
Data sources used to parameterise indicators are detailed in Table 3. In most cases the results by criteria 228 
are reported directly or are a simple intensity as indicated by the measure. Three criteria (damage to 229 
spawning stock, sea bass discarding, and other discarding), however, required the development of 230 
indicators to permit estimation using parameters developed for this study, detailed in section 4.4. In 231 
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many cases the gear assessments are for fishing activity for a particular gear in general, not specifically 232 
activity related to fishing for sea bass. This is due to the fact that activity (e.g. fuel use, labour), 233 
especially in a mixed fishery cannot be separated by species in a meaningful way. In these instances (e.g. 234 
profits, employment, greenhouse gas emissions), the result is expressed for the gear type per kilogram 235 
of landed weight for all species. 236 
It is also the case that there is variance within each gear type. In the nets category there is varying 237 
performance by drift nets and fixed nets and in the trawls category by otter trawls, mid-waters trawls 238 
and beam trawls. As data is not available for each criterion at this level an average has been taken by 239 
ďƌŽĂĚĐĂƚĞŐŽƌǇ ?ǁĞŝŐŚƚĞĚďǇĞĂĐŚŐĞĂƌ ?Ɛcontribution to the landings total. 240 
4.4 Analysis 241 
There is no commonly used indicator to describe damage to spawning stock, although the relevant 242 
components are clear [68]. Consequently, an indicator was developed to describe the likelihood of 243 
impact on the stock from fishing carried out during the spawning season: 244 ܨ ௚ܵ ൌ  ? ܮ ௚ܵǡ௦ܦ௚ǡ௦  (Equation 2) 245 
Where FS is a measure for fishing during the spawning season, g is the gear, s is the season, LS is the 246 
percentage of landings, and D is a damage coefficient. The damage coefficient is defined as 1 for high 247 
spawning (January-April), 0.5 for medium spawning (May, June, December), 0.25 for low spawning (July, 248 
November) and 0 for no spawning (August-October). 249 
The indicator for bass discarding also required the development of new parameters due in part to a 250 
policy change that occurred after the measurement. As the minimum landing size was increased from 251 
36cm to 42cm, an adjusted discard rate was calculated based on the size composition of landings for 252 
each gear (as well as assumptions about avoidance and parameters for survivability). The adjusted bass 253 
discard rate can be expressed as: 254 ܣܦܴܤ௚ ൌ ܦܴܤ௚ ?Ǥ ? ܮܯ௚ܯ௚  (Equation 3) 255 
Where ADRB is an adjusted discard rate of bass, g is the gear, DRB is the recorded discard rate of bass, 256 
LM is the current level of landings in the range of the change in minimum landing size, and M is the rate 257 
of mortality of discards (90% for trawls, 80% for nets, 20% for hooks  ? all estimated from previous 258 
qualitative descriptions)[69, 70]. The same survivability parameters are used for the indicator of total 259 
discards, where ADR is the adjusted discard rate of all species and DR is the recorded discard rate of all 260 
species. 261 ܣܦܴ௚ ൌ ܦܴ௚ܯ௚  (Equation 4) 262 
The results of the 13 criteria for the three major gear types, reported in Table 3, are converted to a 1-5 263 
scoring system by dividing performance outcomes into quintiles. This was completed using the 264 
performance of all gear types across UK fisheries, although for economic value chain, sea bass discards 265 
and other discards, the quintiles are simply a relative scoring of the range for the three major gear types 266 
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targeting sea bass as these three criteria are specific to the fishery. An approach based only on relative 267 
performance would fail to reward improvements unless the major gear types change positions. It would 268 
also lose any sense of scale in a two-gear comparison (as all scores would be a 1 or 5). A description of 269 
the methodology used for converting performance into a 1-5 scoring system is provided in Table 2 of the 270 
Supplementary Material. 271 
Two sensitivity analyses are also performed. The first sensitivity analysis is an adjustment to the gear 272 
assessment for issues with scoring in the gear assessment. The maximum range is found by adding 0.5 to 273 
each criterion score up to a maximum of 5 and the minimum range is found by removing 0.5 from each 274 
criterion score to a minimum of 1. An additional sensitivity analysis is an adjustment to the criteria 275 
weightings to optimise the overall performance of each gear type. These weightings were found by 276 
using a solver function to maximise the difference between each gear and the average of the other two 277 
gears being compared. 278 
4.5 Criteria weightings 279 
To approach the issue of criteria importance, 50 stakeholders of the English sea bass fishery were 280 
surveyed (Annex I of the Supplementary Material). These include 7 industry representatives (large-scale, 281 
small-scale, processing), 18 fishers (netters, trawlers, hook and line), 10 people working in management 282 
(inshore management, scientific advice), 5 people working for NGOs (conservation, angling), and 10 non-283 
expert citizens. The survey, conducted between January and September 2017, asked these stakeholders 284 
to weight the 13 indicators from 1 (low) to 5 (high) for their importance.  285 
The ranking survey was purposefully distributed to a multi-sectoral stakeholder group working on sea 286 
bass, and all members of the steering group and their constituents were invited to respond [71,72]. 287 
Further quayside and telephone interviews were conducted following suggestions from regulators, 288 
managers, scientists and commercial fisheries representatives, for harder to reach stakeholders, to 289 
ensure their views were captured [73]. Potential biases may be present as a result of the different 290 
survey formats  ? in the case of regulators, large scale industry representatives and NGO stakeholders, 291 
the excel table was easy to complete, however small-scale fishers required an approach which did not 292 
require the same level of computer literacy. Therefore the excel table was rephrased as direct questions, 293 
referring specifically to sea bass, and the relative importance of that species to the fisher being asked 294 
(see Annex 1). These surveys were posted, emailed or asked over the phone to 10 of the fishers and 295 
transcribed accordingly into the excel sheet for analysis. 296 
5 Results 297 
5.1 Gear assessment using criteria  298 
The three gear types are compared to each other using the criteria and measures described in Table 3. 299 
Vessels using trawls were the most profitable fleets fishing for sea bass, however they supported the 300 
fewest jobs per tonne of sea bass landed, had a lower average price (£6.50-£7 per kg) as well as the 301 
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highest discard rates, impact on spawning stock mortality, marine mammal bycatch and ecosystem 302 
damage.  303 
Vessels using nets performed better on the environmental criteria (except for ghost fishing) than vessels 304 
using trawls and have a lower impact on spawning stock mortality, while overall also being dependent 305 
on sea bass for 12% of their income. Netters also landed most (52%) of their catch to sea bass 306 
dependent ports and provided a higher number of jobs per kg of sea bass than mobile gear, while 307 
receiving the lowest subsidy per kg.  308 
Most jobs per kg of sea bass were supported by hook and line fishing. The price per kg was also highest 309 
(£9.50 per kg), while also having the lowest discard rates and impact on spawning stock mortality. In 310 
terms of their dependence on sea bass, hook and line were the most (15%) dependent on sea bass and 311 
landed 55% of their sea bass into sea bass dependent ports. There is also little to no unwanted bycatch.312 
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Table 3. Gear assessment by criteria. 313 
Criteria Data sources Measure 
Results Score (1 low - 5 high) 
Nets Trawls Hooks Nets Trawls Hooks 
Profits 
STECF (2017) The 2017 annual 
economic report on the EU 
fishing fleet 
£/kg landed 
weight 
0.41 0.43 0.19 5 5 2 
Employment 
STECF (2017) The 2017 annual 
economic report on the EU 
fishing fleet 
jobs/kg landed 
weight 
0.04 0.02 0.05 4 2 5 
Greenhouse 
gas 
emissions 
STECF (2017) The 2017 annual 
economic report on the EU 
fishing fleet 
kg of CO2/kg 
landed weight 
1.46 2.57 2.52 4 2 2 
Subsidies 
STECF (2017) The 2017 annual 
economic report on the EU 
fishing fleet; Borrello et al. (2013) 
Fuel subsidies in the EU fisheries 
sector  
£/kg landed 
weight 
0.06 0.1 0.1 4 2 2 
Economic 
value chain 
MMO (2017) UK and foreign 
vessels landings by UK port and 
UK vessels landings abroad 
price/kg landed 
weight 
7.4 7.8 9.9 1 1 5 
Sea bass 
discards 
ICES (2014) Report of the inter-
benchmark protocol for sea bass; 
Cefas Length distribution of bass 
discards in the UK trawl fishery  
kg of dead bass 
discards/kg of 
sea bass landed 
0.07 0.23 0 4 1 5 
Other 
discards 
Cefas (2014) Discard Atlas of the 
North Western Waters Demersal 
Fisheries; Imares (2014) Discard 
Atlas of North Sea fisheries 
kg of dead 
discards/kg 
landed weight 
0.03 0.11 0 4 1 5 
Spawning 
season 
mortality 
MMO (2017) UK and foreign 
vessels landings by UK port and 
UK vessels landings abroad 
Percentage of 
fishing during 
spawning 
season 
51% 54% 29% 2 2 4 
Bycatch 
Seafish (2017) Risk Assessment 
for Sourcing Seafood 
RASS score (1 
low risk - 5 high 
risk) 
3/5 4/5 1/5 3 2 5 
Ecosystem 
damage 
Seafish (2017) Risk Assessment 
for Sourcing Seafood 
RASS score (1 
low risk - 5 high 
risk) 
1/5 4/5 1/5 5 2 5 
Ghost 
fishing 
IEEP & Poseidon (2005) Ghost 
fishing by lost fishing gear 
Descriptive 
Medi
um 
Low 
Very 
low 
2 4 5 
Fleet 
dependency 
MMO (2017) UK and foreign 
vessels landings by UK port and 
UK vessels landings abroad 
Percentage of 
total value from 
sea bass 
landings (%) 
12% 1% 15% 4 1 5 
Port 
dependency 
MMO (2017) UK and foreign 
vessels landings by UK port and 
UK vessels landings abroad 
Percentage of 
sea bass 
landings to sea 
bass-dependent 
ports (>£10,000 
and >10% of 
landed value) 
52% 5% 55% 4 1 4 
   
  Total 46 26 54 
Notes: Results generated from data described within the identified data sources. Score assigned to each criterion based on 314 
quintile boundaries and method presented in Supplementary Material Table 2.315 
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Based on this gear assessment across the 13 criteria, vessels using hooks achieve the highest 316 
performance (a score of 54 out of a possible 65 whereas nets scores 46 and trawls 26). These vessels did 317 
not universality score higher across all the criteria however and it may be the case that some criteria are 318 
more important than others. 319 
5.2 MCDA weighting and scores  320 
Figure 4 shows the results from the stakeholder weighting exercise for each of the 13 criteria. Across 321 
stakeholder groups there is a wide range of rank order preferences for each of the criteria. In the most 322 
extreme case, profitability was the most important criterion for fishers, whereas this was the least 323 
important criterion for citizens. For others, such as employment, there was a high level of consensus 324 
regarding rank order preference across stakeholder groups. However, in terms of the actual values to 325 
assign for the weightings, there was generally broad agreement across stakeholder groups. Only four 326 
indicators (profits, greenhouse gas emissions, spawning season mortality, and bycatch) have a spread of 327 
more than two points between the highest and lowest scores. There is, however, a wide spread in the 328 
weightings assigned by individual stakeholders in each group (see Supplementary Material Table 1). All 329 
criteria have an average weighting of over 2.5, indicating that all criteria were seen to have merit in the 330 
analysis. 331 
 332 
Fig. 3. Criteria weighting by each stakeholder group. 333 
The results of the MCDA, using the gear performance scores and different weighting scenarios are 334 
illustrated in Figure 5. There is little difference in the results using the weightings from each stakeholder 335 
group. In all cases, gears with hooks have the highest MCDA score, followed by nets, followed by trawls 336 
(see Figure 1 in the Supplementary Material). 337 
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 338 
Fig. 4. MCDA scores by gear for each stakeholder group. 339 
The small difference between the MCDA scores by gear for the different stakeholder groups is a 340 
reflection of the similar weightings provided by each stakeholder group. Compared to the unweighted 341 
gear assessment, the weightings from fishers yield a small preference for vessels using nets, the 342 
weightings from industry representatives yield a small preference for vessels using trawls, and the 343 
weightings from management, NGOs, and citizens give a small preference for vessels using hooks. In all 344 
cases the difference in results are not significant. 345 
Sensitivity analysis 346 
The first sensitivity analysis adjusts the gear assessments by half a point in either direction to account 347 
for potential errors in the assessment of performance. The results reveal that if vessels using nets were 348 
frequently underestimated and vessels using hooks were frequently overestimated then the overall 349 
scores for the two gears may converge. Even under the most extreme changes considered here, the 350 
ranking of vessels using trawls against other gear types does not change. 351 
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 352 
Fig. 5. MCDA score by gear using adjusted assessment scores. 353 
The second sensitivity analysis, using weightings to maximise the relative performance for each gear 354 
moves the results much closer together, with vessels using nets ranking above vessels using hooks under 355 
some weightings (Figure 6). This contrasts with the actual weightings provided by stakeholder groups 356 
(see Supplementary Material Table 1). The results in Figure 6 also illustrate the contribution of each 357 
criterion to the overall MCDA score.  358 
 359 
Fig. 6. MCDA score by gear using optimised weightings. 360 
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6 Discussion 361 
6.1 Relevance of findings 362 
This MCDA framework provides a case study in how to apply performance-based allocation of fishing 363 
opportunities, using available data in a transparent and objective manner which could serve as a basis 364 
for the allocation of fishing opportunities by Member States, in this case England.  365 
Taking a criteria-based approach to fishing opportunities in the English sea bass fishery yields interesting 366 
results  ? both practically and at a broader level. Most directly, it is clear from the results that when 367 
taking a broad approach that includes social, economic, and environmental criteria a ranking of 368 
performance emerges with vessels using hooks at the top, followed by vessels using nets, and finally 369 
vessels using trawls. Interestingly, this ranking is consistent across different weightings applied by 370 
stakeholder groups. These findings are significant for decision makers as controversial allocation 371 
decisions continue to be made on an annual basis. 372 
At a broader level, the study also shows that it is possible with available data to construct a transparent, 373 
objective, and informative framework on which to base decisions on the allocation of fishing 374 
opportunities. This performance-based approach to allocating a resource is used in other fields, such as 375 
ƚŚĞ ?ďĞĂƵƚǇĐŽŶƚĞƐƚƐ ?ƚŽĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĞƚŚĞůŝĐĞŶƐŝŶŐŽĨmobile networks throughout much of Europe using 376 
comparative tender [74,75]. 377 
Given that decision makers will continue to have to make controversial decisions regarding allocation of 378 
fishing opportunities, it may prove beneficial to political discourse to take an evidence-based approach 379 
like the one developed here. Fisheries are rivalrous and therefore any policy or allocation decision is 380 
likely to produce winners and losers. MCDA can be used to resolve conflicts in a transparent and 381 
objective manner, which can also be tied to wider policy objectives [76].  382 
The MCDA approach taken here (based on multi-attribute utility theory) is one common approach to 383 
MCDA but it is not the only one. Other approaches differ in whether and how the weightings are used, 384 
as well as how the weightings are obtained. One alternative would be to use pairwise comparisons to 385 
identify the importance of each criteria relative to each other. Each MCDA approach has its own 386 
advantages and disadvantages [77,78]. One promising possibility to use MCDA in the allocation of fishing 387 
opportunities is for all stakeholder groups to complete their weightings in the same setting. While more 388 
demanding of resources, this could lead to a better understanding of agreement and conflict between 389 
stakeholder groups [79]. 390 
Significantly, the least profitable fishing gear (vessels using hooks) in the English sea bass fishery were 391 
found to have the highest MCDA score. In this particular instance, utilising market systems to determine 392 
the allocation of fishing opportunities would therefore work against wider social, economic, and 393 
environmental objectives [80].  394 
dŚĞƉƌŽƐƉĞĐƚŽĨ ?ƌĞǆŝƚ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞh<ĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶŝŶŐŝƚƐŽǁŶĨŝƐŚĞƌŝes policy outside of the CFP does not 395 
significantly alter any of these findings, or the value of using MCDA to allocate fishing opportunities 396 
throughout the EU. Decisions regarding the allocation of fishing opportunities under Article 17 is already 397 
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up to individual Member States. Such a framework could, in theory, be applied to the sharing of fishing 398 
ŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚŝĞƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞh<ĂŶĚhŝŶƐƚĞĂĚŽĨ ?ƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞƐƚĂďŝů ƚǇ ?ďĂƐĞĚŽŶŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĨŝƐŚŝŶŐ ?ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚ399 
this is unlikely as the UK and EU Member States may have different agreed objectives for fisheries 400 
management. Whatever the outcome of UK EU exit, the requirements the approach to the allocation of 401 
fishing opportunities as they relate to national and transboundary decision making mean they must 402 
adhere to the principles of the Aarhus Convention; MCDA, as a transparent system of decision making 403 
presents one method for achieving this.  404 
6.2 Average versus marginal analysis 405 
This MCDA model uses information on the historic performance of different gear types to illustrate how 406 
Article 17 could be applied to UK sea bass fishing. The gear performance per tonne of landing is taken as 407 
an average due to the data available. As alternative allocations of sea bass fishing opportunities for 408 
different gears would involve a marginal change, with more data it would be important to analyse how 409 
one specific tonne could have different impacts. It is possible that the costs and benefits of each 410 
additional tonne of quota are non-linear for the fleets. This point is sometimes raised when fishing 411 
opportunities for choke species are discussed, although for the time being the landing obligation is not 412 
being applied to sea bass in the demersal fisheries landing obligation and so this issue is currently less 413 
pressing. 414 
6.3 Unavoidable bycatch 415 
Fisheries resource allocation is a messy problem [81] and all models are tools offering a simplification of 416 
reality. For example, the MCDA framework presented does not account for the impacts of, for example, 417 
adverse consequences of reducing fishing opportunities to fishing activities which might otherwise 418 
continue to contribute to mortality due to the discarding of unavoidable bycatch (sea bass, in this 419 
instance). There are therefore conflicts between the commitments of the CFP that seek to incentivise 420 
selective gear and eliminate discards, while also accepting that some level of sea bass bycatch is 421 
inevitable. This conflict does not however nullify the application of such the MCDA model, but it does 422 
require scenario planning and the consequences to be considered and management to address these 423 
issues. Solutions have been applied elsewhere to address this conflict, for example the 'cod recovery 424 
plan' [82] included provisions for 'real time closures' when discarding threatened the objective of the 425 
plan. In light of this complexity, the MCDA results are just one input into resource allocation and fishing 426 
opportunities are just one policy tool to address excessive sea bass mortality. 427 
7 Conclusion  428 
The poor state of the sea bass stock has focused attention on the issue of how to ensure that the limited 429 
fishing opportunities available are protecting fleets and ports dependent on sea bass, while also 430 
providing the right incentives for fishing practices that maximise social and economic outcomes while 431 
minimizing environmental damage. 432 
Article 17 of the CFP provides EU Member States with a clear opportunity to allocate (or reallocate) 433 
quota and other fishing opportunities in a way that is aligned with the public interest. Under Article 17, 434 
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Member States shall provide incentives to vessels to use more selective gear or gear with a generally 435 
lower environmental impact.  436 
From the results of this study, it is clear that applying performance criteria relevant to Article 17 would 437 
enable decision makers to look at the wider social, environmental and economic value of sea bass and 438 
allocate any fishing opportunities according to these criteria, thus meeting their legal obligations under 439 
the &WĂŶĚƚŚĞh< ?ƐDĂƌŝŶĞWŽůŝĐǇ^ƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚ ?440 
The research presented here attempts to bridge the gap between theory and practice in the 441 
implementation of fisheries policy; this gap is often the reason for policies failing to meet their intended 442 
outcomes. Failure in this regard arises because policy implementation in complex dynamic systems such 443 
as fisheries management, in the absence of systems for implementation, is particularly challenging. The 444 
methods presented here demonstrate a framework for the assessment of the social, economic and 445 
environmental criteria on which to base the allocation of fishing opportunities. Such a tool has utility for 446 
the agencies and departments charged with implementation of policy as the research indicates how the 447 
policy objectives of the reformed CFP, the UK's Marine Policy Statement, and economic resilience in 448 
coastal communities may be met through the use of such a technique. 449 
 450 
Acknowledgements  451 
This work was supported by the Oak Foundation, Adessium Foundation, and the Calouste Gulbenkian 452 
Foundation who contributed to funds to the New Economics Foundation ?Ɛ ?ĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƐĨŽr fair and 453 
ƐƵƐƚĂŝŶĂďůĞĨŝƐŚĞƌŝĞƐ ?programme. 454 
 455 
References 456 
[1@%HUNHV))LVKHUPHQDQGµ7KH7UDJHG\RIWKH&RPPRQV¶&DPEULGJH8QLYHUVLW\3UHVV
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0376892900015939  
[2] United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS, 1982).  (Accessed 30/10/2017) 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part7.htm  
[3] European Commission (2013) Official Journal of the European Union 28.12.2013. REGULATION (EU) No 
1380/2013 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 11 December 2013 on the Common 
Fisheries Policy, amending Council Regulations (EC) No 1954/2003 and (EC) No 1224/2009 and repealing Council 
Regulations (EC) No 2371/2002 and (EC) No 639/2004 and Council Decision 2004/585/EC (Accessed 3/11/2017) 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32013R1380&from=EN 
[4] European Commission (2008) Directive 2008/56/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 
2008 establishing a framework for community action in the field of marine environmental policy (Marine Strategy 
Framework Directive) (Accessed 3/11/2017) http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2008/56/oj Accessed online on 30/10/2017 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32008L0056  
[5] European Comission (2008) Directive 2008/56/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 
establishing a framework for community action in the field of marine environmental policy (Marine Strategy 
Framework Directive) (Accessed 3/11/2017) http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2008/56/oj Accessed online on 30/10/2017 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32008L0056 
[6] CarSHQWHU*.OHLQMDQV59LOODVDQWH6DQG2¶/HDU\%&/DQGLQJWKHEODPH7KHLQIOXHQFHRI(80HPEHU
States on quota setting. Marine Policy 64: 9-15.  
[7] European Commission (2013) Official Journal of the European Union 28.12.2013. REGULATION (EU) No 
1380/2013 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 11 December 2013 on the Common 
Fisheries Policy, amending Council Regulations (EC) No 1954/2003 and (EC) No 1224/2009 and repealing Council 
                                                          
  
20 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Regulations (EC) No 2371/2002 and (EC) No 639/2004 and Council Decision 2004/585/EC (Accessed 3/11/2017) 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32013R1380&from=EN  
[8] Grieve, C (2009) Environmental and Social Criteria for Allocating Access to Fisheries Resources. Meridian Prime. 
(Accessed 29/10/2017) http://www.seas-at-
risk.org/images/pdf/archive/Environmental_and_Social_Criteria_for_Allocating_Access_to_Fisheries_Resources__C
ase_Studies_by_Meridian_Prime.pdf  
[9] Blomeyer, R. Nieto, F. Sanz, A. Stobberup, K and Erzini, K (2015) Criteria for allocating access to fishing in the 
EU. European Parliament's Committee on Committee on Fisheries. (Accessed 30/10/2017)  
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/540357/IPOL_STU(2015)540357_EN.pdf  
[10] Carpenter, G and Kleinjans, R. (2017) Who gets to fish: the allocation of fishing opportunities in EU Member 
States. New Economics Foundation, London. (Accessed 30/10/2017) http://neweconomics.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/03/Carpenter-Kleinjans-Who-gets-to-fish-16.03.pdf 
[11] Rosetto, M et al (2015) Multi-criteria decision-making for fisheries management: A case study of Mediterranean  
demersal fisheries. Marine Policy, Volume 53, March 2015, Pages 83-93.  
[12] Pawson, M.G. Kupschus, S and Pickett , G.D. (2006) The status of sea bass (Dicentrarchus labrax) stocks 
around England and Wales, derived using a separable catch-at-age model, and implications for fisheries 
management. The Centre for Environment, Fisheries and Aquaculture Science (Cefas). Oxford Journals on behalf of 
the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea.  
[13] UK Government. (2015) New sea bass stock protection measures. Department for Environment, Food & Rural 
Affairs and George Eustice MP. (Accessed 30/10/2017) https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-sea-bass-stock-
protection-measures  
[14] Pawson, M.G. Kupschus, S and Pickett , G.D. (2006) The status of sea bass (Dicentrarchus labrax) stocks 
around England and Wales, derived using a separable catch-at-age model, and implications for fisheries 
management. The Centre for Environment, Fisheries and Aquaculture Science (Cefas). Oxford Journals on behalf of 
the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea.  
[15] International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (2017) ICES Advice on fishing opportunities, catch, and effort 
Celtic Seas and Greater North Sea Ecoregions.  
Seabass (Dicentrarchus labrax) in divisions 4.b±c, 7.a, and 7.d±h (central and southern North Sea, Irish Sea, English 
Channel, Bristol Channel, and Celtic Sea). (Accessed 30/10/2017) 
http://ices.dk/sites/pub/Publication%20Reports/Advice/2017/2017/bss.27.4bc7ad-h.pdf  
[16] Ares, E (2016) House of Commons Briefing Paper Number 00745, 10 January 2016. UK and European Sea bass 
conservation measures. (Accessed 30/10/2017) 
http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/SN00745/SN00745.pdf     
[17] Newman, S (2014) Practical implementation of Article 17 of the CFP: allocating fishing opportunities using 
environmental criteria. RSPB Scotland, Edinburgh. (Accessed 30/10/2017) 
https://www.rspb.org.uk/Images/IEEP_2014_Practical_implementation_of_CFP_Art_17_tcm9-385886.pdf  
[18] Carpenter, G and Kleinjans, R. (2017) Who gets to fish: the allocation of fishing opportunities in EU Member 
States. New Economics Foundation, London. (Accessed 30/10/2017) http://neweconomics.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/03/Carpenter-Kleinjans-Who-gets-to-fish-16.03.pdf  
[19] UK Government (2017) UK takes key step towards fair new fishing policy after Brexit. Department for 
Environment, Food & Rural Affairs and The Rt Hon Michael Gove MP. (Accessed 3/11/2017) 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-takes-key-step-towards-fair-new-fishing-policy-after-brexit  
[20] UK Government (2011) UK Marine Policy Statement: HM Government / Northern Ireland Executive / Scottish 
Government / Welsh Assembly Government London: The Stationery Office. (Accessed 4/08/2017)  
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/69322/pb3654-marine-policy-
statement-110316.pdf  
[21] Pawson, M.G. Kupschus, S and Pickett , G.D. (2006) The status of sea bass (Dicentrarchus labrax) stocks 
around England and Wales, derived using a separable catch-at-age model, and implications for fisheries 
management. The Centre for Environment, Fisheries and Aquaculture Science (Cefas). Oxford Journals on behalf of 
the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea.  
[22] International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (2017) Seabass (Dicentrarchus labrax) in divisions 4.b±c, 7.a, 
and 7.d±h (central and southern North Sea, Irish Sea, English Channel, Bristol Channel, and Celtic Sea). (Accessed 
30/10/2017) http://ices.dk/sites/pub/Publication%20Reports/Advice/2017/2017/bss.27.4bc7ad-h.pdf 
[23] International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (2017) ICES Advice on fishing opportunities, catch, and effort 
Bay of Biscay and the Iberian Coast Ecoregion Published 30 June 2017. Seabass (Dicentrarchus labrax) in divisions 
8.c and 9.a (southern Bay of Biscay and Atlantic Iberian waters) (Accessed 30/10/2017) 
http://ices.dk/sites/pub/Publication%20Reports/Advice/2017/2017/bss.27.8c9a.pdf  
[24] Pawson, M.G. Kupschus, S and Pickett, G.D. (2006) The status of sea bass (Dicentrarchus labrax) stocks 
around England and Wales, derived using a separable catch-at-age model, and implications for fisheries 
management. The Centre for Environment, Fisheries and Aquaculture Science (Cefas). Oxford Journals on behalf of 
the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea. 
  
21 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
[25] European Commission (2015) Sea Bass Q and A. (Accessed 30/10/2017) http://www.nsrac.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/04/Paper-5.2-Sea-Bass-QA.pdf  
[26] Pawson, M.G. Kupschus, S and Pickett , G.D. (2006) The status of sea bass (Dicentrarchus labrax) stocks 
around England and Wales, derived using a separable catch-at-age model, and implications for fisheries 
management. The Centre for Environment, Fisheries and Aquaculture Science (Cefas). Oxford Journals on behalf of 
the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea.  
[27] International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (2016) Sea bass (Dicentrarchus labrax) in divisions 4.b±c, 
7.a, and 7.d±h (central and southern North Sea, Irish Sea, English Channel, Bristol Channel, and Celtic Sea) Version 
2: 11 July 2016 (Accessed 30/10/2017) http://www.ices.dk/sites/pub/Publication%20Reports/Advice/2016/2016/bss-
47.pdf  
[28] Baroness Wilcox speaking before the House of Lords, 2 March 2005. South-west Territorial Waters (Prohibition 
of Pair Trawling) Order 2004. HL Deb 02 March 2005 vol 670 cc331-41. (Accessed 30/10/2017) 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/2005/mar/02/south-west-territorial-waters 
[29] Seafish (2016) Overview of the Welsh sea bass fishing fleet (Accessed 30/10/2017) 
http://www.seafish.org/media/1672991/overview_of_the_welsh_sea_bass_fishing_fleet_final_09-12-16_for_web.pdf  
[30] Marine Management Organisation UK ± MMO (2017). Sea fisheries statistics 2016. (Accessed 30/10/2017) 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/647482/UK_Sea_Fisheries_Statistics_
2016_Full_report.pdf 
[31] Ares, E (2016) House of Commons Briefing Paper Number 00745, 10 January 2016. UK and European Sea bass 
conservation measures. (Accessed 30/10/2017) 
http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/SN00745/SN00745.pdf  
[32] ICES advice on Widely distributed and migratory stocks European seabass in the Northeast Atlantic September 
2012 (Accessed 30/10/2017) http://www.ices.dk/sites/pub/Publication%20Reports/Advice/2012/2012/Bss-comb.pdf  
[33] European Commission (2015) European Commission acts to protect sea bass stock. Accessed on October 29th 
2017, (Accessed 30/10/2017) https://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/european-commission-acts-protect-sea-bass-stock_en  
[34] International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (2016) ICES Advice on fishing opportunities, catch, and effort. 
Sea bass (Dicentrarchus labrax) in divisions 4.b±c, 7.a, and 7.d±h (central and southern North Sea, Irish Sea, English 
Channel, Bristol Channel, and Celtic Sea). Version 2: 11 July 2016 (Accessed 30/10/2017) 
http://www.ices.dk/sites/pub/Publication%20Reports/Advice/2016/2016/bss-47.pdf  
[35] International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (2017) Seabass (Dicentrarchus labrax) in divisions 4.b±c, 7.a, 
and 7.d±h (central and southern North Sea, Irish Sea, English Channel, Bristol Channel, and Celtic Sea). (Accessed 
30/10/2017) http://ices.dk/sites/pub/Publication%20Reports/Advice/2017/2017/bss.27.4bc7ad-h.pdf 
[36@7KHPDLQREVWDFOHUHJDUGLQJDTXRWDIRUEDVVZDVH[SODLQHGE\8.)LVKHULHV0LQLVWHU*HRUJH(XVWLFH³Initially, 
the European Commission suggested a total allowable catch for bass, but we firmly believe that that is not 
appropriate because a new TAC is established on track records of catches, so there is a real danger that that would 
simply lock in a continuation of the current exploitation pattern, which now needs to change radically. A further 
disadvantage of setting a TAC for bass is that it would take no account of the efforts a number of member states have 
already unilaterally taken to limit commercial catches, which would be unfair to those countries´$FFHVVHG
30/10/2017) 
https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmhansrd/cm141203/halltext/141203h0001.htm   
[37] European Commission (2013) REGULATION (EU) No 1380/2013 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF 
THE COUNCIL of 11 December 2013 on the Common Fisheries Policy, amending Council Regulations (EC) No 
1954/2003 and (EC) No 1224/2009 and repealing Council Regulations (EC) No 2371/2002 and (EC) No 639/2004 
and Council Decision 2004/585/EC. Official Journal of the European Union 28.12.2013 (Accessed 30/10/2017) 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32013R1380&from=EN  
[38] European Commission (2015) How is the EU protecting sea bass? (Accessed 30/10/2017) 
https://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/fishing_rules/sea-bass_en  
[39] European Commission (2016) European Commission acts to protect sea bass stock (Accessed 30/10/2017) 
https://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/european-commission-acts-protect-sea-bass-stock_en  
[40@(XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQµ6HDEDVVIDFWV¶$Fcessed 30/10/2017) 
https://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/sites/fisheries/files/docs/body/2015-06-19-seabass-facts_en.pdf  
[41] European Commission (2016) How is the EU protecting sea bass? (Accessed 30/10/2017) 
https://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/fishing_rules/sea-bass_en  
[42] International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (2017) Seabass (Dicentrarchus labrax) in divisions 4.b±c, 7.a, 
and 7.d±h (central and southern North Sea, Irish Sea, English Channel, Bristol Channel, and Celtic Sea). (Accessed 
29/10/2017)  http://ices.dk/sites/pub/Publication%20Reports/Advice/2017/2017/bss.27.4bc7ad-h.pdf  
[43] ICES Advice on fishing opportunities, catch, and effort Celtic Seas and Greater North Sea Ecoregions. Seabass 
(Dicentrarchus labrax) in divisions 4.b±c, 7.a, and 7.d±h (central and southern North Sea, Irish Sea, English Channel, 
Bristol Channel, and Celtic Sea). (2017) (Accessed 30/10/2017) 
http://ices.dk/sites/pub/Publication%20Reports/Advice/2017/2017/bss.27.4bc7ad-h.pdf 
[44] Marine Management Organisation (2018)  https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/clarification-on-fishing-
restrictions-for-bass-in-2018  (Accessed 25/01/2018) 
  
22 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
[45] European Commission (2013) (Accessed on 30/10/2017)  http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2013:354:0022:0061:EN:PDF   
[46] Hernandez-Aguado, S, Segado-Segado, I and Pitcher, T.J. (2016) Towards sustainable fisheries: A multi-criteria 
participatory approach to assessing indicators of sustainable fishing communities: A case study from Cartagena 
(Spain). Marine Policy Volume 65, March 2016, Pages 97-106  
[47] Merlina N. Andalecio. (2010) Multi-criteria decision models for management of tropical coastal fisheries. A 
review. Agronomy for Sustainable Development, Springer Verlag/EDP Sciences/INRA, 30 (3).  
[48] Innes, J and Pascoe, S. (2010) A multi-criteria assessment of fishing gear impacts in demersal fisheries. Journal 
of environmental management Volume 91, Issue 4, March±April 2010, Pages 932-939.  
[49] Stewart, T.J., Joubert, A. & Janssen, R. (2010) MCDA Framework for Fishing Rights Allocation in South Africa. 
Group Decis Negot 19: 247. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-009-9159-9  
[50] Newman, S (2014) Practical implementation of Article 17 of the CFP: allocating fishing opportunities using 
environmental criteria. RSPB Scotland, Edinburgh. (Accessed 30/10/2017) 
https://www.rspb.org.uk/Images/IEEP_2014_Practical_implementation_of_CFP_Art_17_tcm9-385886.pdf    
[51] Carpenter, G and Kleinjans, R. (2017) Who gets to fish: the allocation of fishing opportunities in EU Member 
States. New Economics Foundation, London. (Accessed 30/10/2017) http://neweconomics.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/03/Carpenter-Kleinjans-Who-gets-to-fish-16.03.pdf 
[52] Blomeyer, R., Nieto, F, Sanz, A, Stobberup, K, & Erzini, K. (2015). Criteria for allocating access in the EU. 
(XURSHDQ3DUOLDPHQW¶V&RPPLWWHHRQ)LVKHULHV$FFHVVHG
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/540357/IPOL_STU(2015)540357_EN.pdf  
[53] Cochrane, K.L. (2002) A fishery managers guidebook. Management measures and their application. 
FAO Fisheries Technical Paper. No. 424. Rome, FAO.  231p. United Nations Food and Agricultural Organisation 
(FAO). ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/004/y3427e/y3427e00.pdf  (Accessed 30/10/2017) 
 http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/y3427e/y3427e03.htm#bm03.2  
[54] Cochrane, K.L. (2002) A fishery managers guidebook. Management measures and their application. 
FAO Fisheries Technical Paper. No. 424. Rome, FAO.  231p. United Nations Food and Agricultural Organisation 
(FAO). ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/004/y3427e/y3427e00.pdf  (Accessed 30/10/2017) 
 http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/y3427e/y3427e03.htm#bm03.2  
[55] Mardle, S. and Pascoe S.(2003). Multiple objectives in the management of EU fisheries: The Methodology. 
CEMARE Report 63, University of Portsmouth, UK.  
[56] Defra (2007) Fisheries 2027 - a long-term vision for sustainable fisheries. (Accessed 30/10/2017) 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/69320/pb12780-fisheries2027vision-
071001.pdf 
[57] Defra (2007) Fisheries 2027 - a long-term vision for sustainable fisheries. (Accessed 30/10/2017) 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/69320/pb12780-fisheries2027vision-
071001.pdf  
[58] Baltussen, R and Niessen, L (2006) 'Priority setting of health interventions: the need for multi-criteria decision 
analysis' Cost Effectiveness and Resource Allocation 4:14 https://doi.org/10.1186/1478-7547-4-14  
[59] Wang et al (2009) Review on multi-criteria decision analysis aid in sustainable energy decision-making 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2009.06.021 Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews. Volume 13, Issue 9, Pages 
2263-2278.  
[60] G. Baourakis et al (2002) 'Multicriteria analysis and assessment of financial viability of agri-businesses: The case 
of marketing co-operatives and juice producing companies'. Agribusiness, 18(4): 543±558.   
[61] C. Zopounidis (1999) Multicriteria decision aid in financial management. European Journal of Operational 
Research 119 (1999) 404-415.  
[62] Rossetto et al (2015) Multi-criteria decision-making for fisheries management: A case study of Mediterranean 
demersal fisheries. Marine Policy 53: 83±93  
[63] Zografos, C., Oglethorpe, D (2004) Multi-Criteria Analysis in Ecotourism: Using Goal Programming to Explore 
Sustainable Solutions Current Issues in Tourism Vol. 7, No. 1  
[64] Brown K. et al (2001) Trade-off analysis for marine protected area management. Ecological Economics 37 417±
434  
[65] Mardle, S. and Pascoe S.(2003). Multiple objectives in the management of EU fisheries: The Methodology. 
CEMARE Report 63, University of Portsmouth, UK  
[66] Mardle, S. and Pascoe S.(2003). Multiple objectives in the management of EU fisheries: The Methodology. 
CEMARE Report 63, University of Portsmouth, UK  
[67] HM Treasury. (2013). Green Book supplementary guidance: multi-criteria decision analysis (Accessed 
30/10/2017) https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/green-book-supplementary-guidance-multi-criteria-decision-
analysis 
[68] Sadovy, Y. and Domeier M. (2005) Are aggregation-fisheries sustainable? Reef fish fisheries as a case study. 
Coral Reefs Volume 24, Issue 2,  pp 254±262 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00338-005-0474-6  
[69]Cefas (2014) Length distribution of bass discards in the UK trawl fishery and ICES - Report on the inter-
benchmark protocol on new species. ICES.  
  
23 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
[70] Lewin W.C. et al (2018) Estimating post-release mortality of European sea bass based on experimental angling. 
ICES Journal of Marine Science https://doi.org/10.1093/icesjms/fsx240    
[71] Mardle, S. and Pascoe, S. (2003). Multiple objectives in the management of EU fisheries: The Methodology. 
CEMARE Report 63, University of Portsmouth, UK  
[72] Innes, J and Pascoe, S. (2010) A multi-criteria assessment of fishing gear impacts in demersal fisheries. Journal 
of environmental management Volume 91, Issue 4, March±April 2010, Pages 932-939.  
[73] Kavadas, S. et al (2015) Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis as a tool to extract fishing footprints and estimate fishing 
pressure: application to small scale coastal fisheries and implications for management in the context of the Maritime 
Spatial Planning Directive. Mediterranean Marine Science Vol 16, No 2  
[74] Cartelier, L. (2003) Auctions Versus Beauty Contests: The Allocation of UMTS Licences in Europe. Annals of 
Public and Cooperative Economics 74 (1): 63-85  
[75] Andersson P, Hultén S and Valiente P (2005) Beauty contest licensing lessons from the 3G process in Sweden. 
Telecommunications Policy 29 (8): 577-593.  
[76] Mardle, S. and Pascoe S.(2003). Multiple objectives in the management of EU fisheries: The Methodology. 
CEMARE Report 63, University of Portsmouth, UK  
[77] HM Treasury (2011) The Green Book - Appraisal and Evaluation in Central Government. London 
[78] Cinelli et al (2014) Analysis of the potentials of multi criteria decision analysis methods to conduct sustainability 
assessment. Ecological Indicators. Volume 46, 138-148. 
[79] Abel, E. (2015) Preference Elicitation from Pairwise Comparisons for Traceable Multi-Criteria Decision Making. 
The University of Manchester Doctoral Thesis   
[80] Mardle, S. and Pascoe S. (2003). Multiple objectives in the management of EU fisheries: The Methodology. 
CEMAR E Report 63, University of Portsmouth, UK  
[81] Ackoff, R. L. (1974) The systems revolution. Long Range Planning. Volume 7, Issue 6, December 1974, 2-20 
https://doi.org/10.1016/0024-6301(74)90127-7 
[82] COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER ± Report of the Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for 
fisheries evaluation of the report of the STECF-SGRST (07-01) Working Group on Evaluation of the cod recovery 
plan. Hamburg 26-30MARCH, 2007 (Accessed 25/01/2018) 
https://stecf.jrc.ec.europa.eu/documents/43805/122927/07-03_SG-RST+07-01+-
+Evaluation+of+the+Cod+Recovery+Plan.pdf 
